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Abstract. A “framing” effect occurs when an agent’s choices are not invariant under changes in the 
way a choice problem is formulated, e.g. changes in the way the options are described (violation of 
description invariance) or in the way preferences are elicited (violation of procedure invariance). In 
this paper we examine precisely which classical conditions of rationality it is whose non-satisfaction 
may lead to framing effects. We show that (under certain conditions), if (and only if) an agent's initial 
dispositions on a set of propositions are “implicitly inconsistent”, her decisions may be “path-
dependent”, i.e. dependent on the order in which the propositions are considered. We suggest that 
different ways of framing a choice problem may induce the order in which relevant propositions are 
considered and hence affect the decision made. This theoretical explanation suggests some 
observations about human psychology which are consistent with those made by psychologists and 
provides a unified framework for explaining violations of description and procedure invariance.   
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The choices that people make are sometimes sensitive to the way in which the question is put. 
They may depend on the way in which options are described or on the way in which 
preferences are elicited. They are not always “description invariant” or “procedure invariant”. 
In logicians’ language, two choice problems may be “extensionally equivalent”, and yet lead 
to different choices. If we take a descriptive expression from a proposition and substitute a 
different expression that designates the same object this should, ideally, not affect the truth 
value an agent assigns to the proposition. And yet, empirically, it sometimes does. These 
phenomena are called “framing effects”. Psychologists have offered accounts of decision 
making that might explain why violations of description invariance or procedure invariance 
occur, but such framing effects are offensive to a logician's account of rationality. In this 
paper we use a logician's framework to examine exactly which classical conditions of 
rationality it is whose non-satisfaction may lead to framing effects. We show that (under 
certain conditions), if (and only if) an agent's initial dispositions on a set of propositions are 
implicitly inconsistent (as defined below), her decisions may be path-dependent, i.e. 
dependent on the order in which the propositions are considered. We suggest that different 
ways of framing a choice problem may induce the order in which relevant propositions are 
considered and hence affect the decision made. This theoretical explanation suggests some 
observations about human psychology which are consistent with those made by psychologists 
and provides a unified framework within which we can see the similarities between 
explanations of violations of description and procedure invariance.    
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1. Violations of Description Invariance 
 
An early experimental demonstration of framing effects, where the description of the options 
affected the choices that subjects made, is given by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). They 
asked subjects to imagine that the US was threatened by an unusual disease that was expected 
to kill 600 people and that they had to make a choice between two alternative vaccination 
programmes. Two groups were presented with the same choice problem but in different 
forms. The first group were told: 
 
  If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, 
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.  
 
A second group were told that: 
 
  If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that no-one will die, and 2/3  
probability that 600 people will die. 
 
In the first group, 72% of subjects opted for Program A but in the second group 78% of 
subjects chose Program D. Although A is extensionally equivalent to C and B is extensionally 
equivalent to D, changing the description of the options from one in terms of “lived saved” to 
one in terms of “lives lost” changed the modal preference. 
 
In response to this and other findings in the field of decision making under uncertainty, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory to explain the pattern of people's 
choices. Prospect theory suggests that decision makers code outcomes as gains or losses 
relative to some reference point and then, in their evaluation of the outcomes, are risk averse 
over gains but risk loving over losses. The way a decision problem is framed determines the 
reference point. In the above example, the phrasing “saved” in the first formulation of the 
problem highlights a gain so respondants are risk averse and the phrasing “die” in the second 
highlights a loss so they are risk loving. But although the original examples of framing 
involved risk, this is actually an unnecessary complicating factor. There is other evidence that 
changes in modal preference can be brought about in decisions which do not involve any 
uncertainty, simply by manipulating subjects' reference point and therefore what they regard 
as a gain or a loss. These results can then be explained by the theory of loss aversion, namely 




there are even more general framing effects, not involving gains and losses. For instance, 
when asked to judge the quality of beef, subjects' evaluations depend on whether it is 
described as ‘75% lean’ or ‘25% fat’. These framing effects might all be described as 
“valence framing effects”. Regardless of the presence of risk or reference points, in each case 
the different frames cast the same critical information in either a positive or a negative light. 
This leads to the suggestion that it is the positive or negative encoding of information that 
affects choice (Levin et al. 1998).
2 
 
2. Violations of Procedure Invariance 
 
Framing effects are often thought of as occurring when choices are not invariant under 
changes of the way in which the options in the choice set are described. But there are also 
well documented violations of procedure invariance, where choices are affected by the way in 
which the preference over the options is elicited. In these experiments, by changing the 
method of elicitation of preferences, the same individual can be induced to make inconsistent 
choices. We will show that violation of the same axioms of rationality is responsible for both 
violations of description invariance and violations of procedure invariance.  
 
One example of a violation of procedure invariance is a preference reversal phenomenon 
originally reported by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971). Subjects were asked to evaluate pairs 
of gambles of comparable expected value. One gamble, the P gamble, offers a high 
probability of winning a relatively small amount of money. The other gamble, the $ gamble, 
offers a low probability of winning a larger prize. For instance, one of the pairs was: 
 
  P   g a m b l e      $  gamble 
  Win $2 with probability .80    Win $9.00 with probability .20   
  Lose $0.50 with probability .20    Lose $0.50 with probability .80 
  
Both the gambles above have an expected value of $1.40. Subjects were asked both which 
gamble they preferred to play (a qualitative “choice” task) and also, in a different stage of the 
experiment, if they owned the right to play the gamble, how much they would be willing to 
sell that for (a quantitative “valuation” task). As Lichtenstein and Slovic said, “We say that 
option A is preferred to option B if option A is selected when B is available or if A has a 
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higher reservation price than B. The standard analysis of choice assumes that these procedures 
give rise to the same ordering. This requirement – called procedure invariance – seldom 
appears as an explicit axiom but it is needed to ensure that the preference relation is well 
defined.” (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971, p.203) However, the pattern of choices was that 
subjects said that they preferred to play the P gamble but gave the $ gamble a higher selling 
price. When the experimenters conducted a further study in a casino they found that, for the 
above gambles (with positive expected value), of participants who chose the P gamble 81% 
gave a higher selling price to the $ gamble and, what is more, some of them turned into 
"money pumps" continuously giving more money to the experimenters to switch between the 
gambles without ever playing them (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1973). Similar reversals were 
found when subjects were asked, first, to rate the attractiveness of gambles (valuation) and, 
then, which gamble they preferred to play (choice). The one that scored higher on the 
attractiveness rating was not always the one they said they preferred to play (Ordonez et al. 
1995).  
 
Again, although the original examples of violations of procedure invariance concern 
preference reversals over gambles, this effect does not rely on the presence of risk. The effect 
is operative in a whole class of tasks where there are two options, each of which is assessed in 
terms of more than one attribute, and where there are two different modes of preference 
elicitation, choice versus valuation. In the example of gambles, the attributes might be the 
maximal payoff and the probability of winning the maximal payoff. An example of violations 
of procedure invariance which does not involve uncertainty is given by the comparison of 
“choice” and “matching”, the latter being a type of valuation task. There are two options, with 
two relevant attributes each. In the matching task, for one of the options subjects are given the 
value of both of these attributes, whereas for the other option they are given the value of only 
one. They are then asked to supply the value of the second attribute that would make the two 
options equal in value overall. For instance, subjects are asked to consider two candidates for 
an engineering job, X and Y, who are each assessed on two different attributes, technical 
knowledge and human relations. The matching task might consist of giving the subjects 
candidate X’s scores for both technical knowledge and human relations but only one of 
candidate Y’s scores, e.g. on technical knowledge, and asking what score on the other 
attribute, human relations, would make the two candidates equally suitable for the job. (In 
fact, there are four possible matching tasks depending on which of the four items of 
information is withheld.) From subjects’ responses in the matching task we should be able to 
predict the decisions subjects would make in the choice task, where they are given the values 
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of all attributes, i.e. both X and Y’s scores for both technical knowledge and human relations. 
However, in an experiment, in the choice task 65% of subjects chose the candidate who 
scored higher on the more prominent attribute, technical knowledge, whereas the inference 
from those given a matching task was that only 34% would have rated this candidate as better. 
This leads to the prominence hypothesis that the prominent attribute will, for whatever reason, 
weigh more heavily in choice than in matching (Tversky at al. 1988). 
 
There are two ways in which psychologists suggest that framing can affect the construction of 
preferences, called strategy compatibility and scale compatibility (Fischer and Hawkins 
1993). Strategy compatibility is the hypothesis that different heuristics are used depending on 
the mode of preference elicitation. For instance, choice tasks might induce qualitative, 
lexicographic reasoning (i.e. a focus on a prominent attribute that is considered 
lexicographically prior to other attributes), whereas valuation tasks might induce quantitative 
assessment and explicit trade-offs between different attributes. Scale compatibility is the 
hypothesis that choices always involve the same heuristic where multiple conflictual 
attributes of the options are adjudicated, but different modes of preference elicitation lead to 
the assignment of different weights to different attributes. According to this hypothesis, in the 
above example, when subjects are asked to choose their preferred gamble, the probability of 
winning the maximal payoff is the attribute with the greater weight, whereas when they are 
asked for their monetary valuations of the gambles, the maximal payoff is the attribute with 
the greater weight.  
 
3. A Simple Model 
 
We seek to explain framing effects by attributing to the agent a sequential decision process in 
which the agent considers multiple propositions. Specifically, in our model the agent 
considers not only the “target proposition” (on which the agent has to make a decision), but 
also multiple other “background propositions”, which may be logically connected to the 
target proposition, and which describe the “run-up” or “context” to the agent’s decision on the 
target proposition. The background propositions may include factual propositions on which 
the agent might have beliefs that are relevant to his or her decision on the target proposition. 
They may further include normative propositions whose resolution (e.g. acceptance or 
rejection) may entail a particular stance on the target proposition. In short, the background 
propositions include all those propositions that the agent may consider in the process leading 





The model of a sequential decision process follows List (2002). We first need to give a few 
preliminary definitions. Let X be a set of propositions, including the “target proposition” and 
relevant “background propositions”.
3 The propositions are formalized in terms of first-order 
predicate calculus.
4 In particular, the set X may include 
 
•  atomic propositions with zero-place predicates (no logical connectives), e.g. P, Q, …; 
•  atomic propostions with one-place predicates (no logical connectives), e.g. Aa (“a has 
property A”); 
•  atomic propositions with two-place predicates (no logical connectives), including 
ranking propositions,  e.g. aPb (“a is strictly preferred to b”); 
•  compound propositions (with logical connectives and/or quantifiers), e.g. (P ∧ Q), 
∀x(Ax → Bx), ∀x∀y((Ax ∧ ¬Ay) → xPy). 
We define a decision-path to be a one-to-one mapping Ω : {1, 2, ..., l} → X, where l ≤ k = 
|X|.
5 We interpret Ω(1), Ω(2), Ω(3), ..., respectively, as the first, second, third ... propositions 
considered by the agent. A decision-path Ω is complete if l=k (i.e. it reaches all propositions 
in X), and incomplete if l<k (i.e. it reaches some but not all propositions in X). 
 
A decision-path can be interpreted in (at least) two different ways: (i) as the temporal order in 
which the agent considers the propositions; or (ii) as the order of how focal the propositions 
are for the agent, or how much weight the agent assigns to the propositions. 
 
In this model of a sequential decision process, the agent considers the propositions, one by 
one, in the order represented by a given decision-path. An agent’s acceptance or rejection of 
each proposition in that sequence is determined by two criteria: (i) initial dispositions, and (ii) 
a conflict resolution rule.  
 
Initial dispositions. For each proposition φ in X, an agent’s initial disposition on φ is the 
judgment (acceptance/rejection) the agent would make on φ if he or she were to consider φ in 
isolation, with no reference to other propositions (particularly previously considered ones). 
Note that an initial disposition is a counterfactual notion. Saying that an agent has an initial 
disposition on φ does not carry any implications as to whether the agent has in fact considered 
the proposition. The agent’s initial dispositions on the propositions in X are represented by an 
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nor contradictions; (iii) we assume that X includes proposition-negation pairs (i.e. for every proposition 
φ in X, ¬φ is also in X); (iv) for each φ in Φ, we identify ¬¬φ with φ. 
4 For an exposition of the formalism of first-order predicate calculus, see Hamilton (1988). 
5 The assumption that Ω is one-to-one means that, for all a and b in the domain of Ω, Ω(a)=Ω(b) ⇒ 
a=b. The requirement that a decision-path be a one-to-one mapping ensures that no proposition occurs 




acceptance/rejection function δ : X → {0, 1}. For each φ in X, δ(φ) = 1 means that the agent 
has an initial disposition to accept φ, and δ(φ) = 0 means that the agent has an initial 
disposition to reject φ.  
 
A conflict resolution rule. There are sometimes conflicts between an agent’s initial 
disposition on a new proposition and previously accepted propositions; specifically, the 
agent’s initial disposition on a new proposition may be logically inconsistent (and perceived 
so by the agent) with his or her previously accepted propositions. A conflict resolution rule is 
a method of resolving such conflict. The modus ponens rule – which is used in our model 
below – resolves conflict by accepting the logical implications of previously accepted 
propositions and overruling the initial disposition on the new proposition.  
 
Attributing the modus ponens rule to an agent turns out to be particularly useful for 
explaining framing effects, in so far as that rule captures the notion that the “run-up” to the 
agent’s decision on a certain proposition may constrain the agent’s decision on that 
proposition. The “run-up” to the decision on a target proposition is precisely what is induced 
by a decision frame, and what may vary from frame to frame. Other conflict resolution 
methods are conceivable, particularly the modus tollens rule, which resolves conflict by 
accepting the initial disposition on the new proposition and revising previously accepted 
propositions; but our model will explicitly use the modus ponens rule. 
 
We can define a modus ponens decision process in terms of a formal procedure. 
 
•  Consider the propositions, one by one, in the order determined by a given 
decision-path, say proposition φ1 (:= Ω(1)) at time 1, proposition φ2 (:= Ω(2)) at 
time 2, and so on. 
•  At each time t, when proposition φt is being considered, determine whether or not 
previously accepted propositions in the sequence have a logical implication for 
the acceptance or rejection of φt.  
If yes:  
Ignore the initial disposition (δ(φt)) on φt.  
 Accept  φt if previously accepted propositions imply φt. 
 Reject  φt if previously accepted propositions imply the negation of φt. 
If no:  
Accept φt if the initial disposition on φt is positive, i.e. if δ(φ) = 1. 





We consider four rationality conditions which the initial dispositions of an individual may, or 
may not, satisfy.  
 
Completeness. An agent’s initial dispositions are complete if, for any proposition φ, the agent 
has a disposition to accept the proposition φ or its negation ¬φ (formally, δ(φ)=1 or δ(¬φ)=1). 
 
Weak Consistency. An agent’s initial dispositions are weakly consistent if the agent never 
has a disposition to accept a proposition φ and its negation ¬φ simultaneously (formally, not 
both δ(φ)=1 and δ(¬φ)=1). 
 
The define a stronger notion of consistency, we need to introduce the notion of semantic 
consistency. A subset Y of X is semantically consistent if there exists a consistent assignment 
of truth-values which makes all the propositions in Y simultaneously true. 
 
Strong Consistency. An agent’s initial dispositions are strongly consistent if it is possible for 
all the propositions which the agent has a disposition to accept to be simultaneously true 
(formally, the set {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1} is semantically consistent). 
 
Deductive Closure. An agent’s initial dispositions are deductively closed if, whenever the 
agent has a disposition to accept a set of propositions Ψ and Ψ implies another proposition φ, 
then the agent also has a disposition to accept φ (formally, if [δ(ψ)=1 for every ψ in Ψ] and 
[Ψ implies φ], then δ(φ)=1).  
 
An agent's initial dispositions are not deductively closed with respect to φ if there exists a 
subset Ψ of X such that [δ(ψ)=1 for every ψ in Ψ] and [Ψ implies φ], but δ(φ)=0. 
 
The four conditions are not all logically independent from each other. Strong consistency 
implies weak consistency. The conjunction of completeness, weak consistency and deductive 
closure implies strong consistency.  
 
Violations of strong consistency by an agent's initial dispositions will be called implicit 
inconsistencies. Lemma A1 in the appendix shows that such violations occur if and only if 
there exist two semantically consistent subsets Ψ1 and Ψ2 of X and a proposition φ in X such 
that [δ(ψ)=1 for every ψ in Ψ1 ∪ Ψ2] and [Ψ1 implies φ] and [Ψ2 implies ¬φ]. We then say 





Violations of weak consistency by an agent's initial dispositions will be called explicit 
inconsistencies. Such violations occur if and only if there exists a proposition φ in X such that 
δ(φ)=1  and  δ(¬φ)=1. We then say that the agent's initial dispositions are explicitly 
inconsistent with respect to φ.  
 
Informally, an agent's initial dispositions are explicitly inconsistent if the agent has a 
disposition to accept both a proposition and the negation of that proposition. An agent's initial 
dispositions are implicitly inconsistent if some of the propositions which the agent has a 
disposition to accept imply the negation of what is implied by other propositions which the 
agent has a disposition to accept. In that case, the agent may or may not have a disposition to 
accept those implications themselves. If the agent has such a disposition, the inconsistency is 
not merely implicit, but also explicit. If the agent has no such disposition, on the other hand, 
the inconsistency is merely implicit, but not explicit. All explicit inconsistencies are also 
implicit inconsistencies, but not all implicit inconsistencies are also explicit inconsistencies. 
 
Suppose, for example, an agent has an initial disposition to accept the propositions P, (P→Q) 
and  ¬Q, but no other propositions. Then the agent's initial dispositions are implicitly 
inconsistent (and thus violate strong consistency): the set of propositions accepted by the 
agent has two semantically consistent subsets, namely Ψ1 = {P, (P→Q)} and Ψ2 = {¬Q}, 
such that Ψ1 implies Q and Ψ2 implies ¬Q. However, the agent's initial dispositions are not 
explicitly inconsistent (and thus they satisfy weak consistency): there exists no proposition 
such that the agent has a disposition to accept the proposition and its negation simultaneously. 
 
Our main theorem (see also List 2002) shows that an implicit inconsistency in an agent's 
initial dispositions is a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of path-
dependencies in a modus ponens decision process. The theorem follows immediately from 
lemma A2 in the appendix. 
 
Theorem 1. Suppose the agent uses a modus ponens decision process. Then  
(i)  there exist (at least) two alternative decision-paths such that, under one path, 
φ is accepted and, under the other, ¬φ is accepted  
if and only if  





Implicit inconsistencies (i.e. condition (ii)) occur when the agent's initial dispositions are 
explicitly inconsistent, or when they satisfy weak consistency, but an inconsistency is 
"hidden" by a violation of deductive closure. Note the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1.  Suppose the agent's initial dispositions over the propositions satisfy completeness 
and weak consistency. Then  
(i)  the agent's initial dispositions are implicitly inconsistent with respect to φ 
if and only if 
(ii)  the agent's initial dispositions are not deductively closed with respect to φ. 
 
The conjunction of theorem 1 and lemma 1 immediately implies the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 2. Suppose the agent’s initial dispositions over the propositions satisfy 
completeness and weak consistency. Suppose the agent uses a modus ponens decision 
process. Then 
(i)  there exist (at least) two alternative decision-paths such that, under one path, 
φ is accepted and, under the other, ¬φ is accepted  
if and only if  
(ii)  the agent's initial dispositions are not deductively closed with respect to φ. 
 
4. Violations of Description Invariance as Path-Dependence 
 
We can use the framework above to illuminate violations of description invariance. Take the 
unusual disease problem of Kahneman and Tversky introduced above, where presentation 1 is 
given in terms of “lives saved” and presentation 2 is given in terms of “lives lost”. Let us 
define three predicates: 
 
Qx : x saves some lives with certainty (and does not involve a risk that no-one will be saved). 
Rx : x consigns some people to death with certainty (and does not involve the chance that no-
one will die). 
xPy : x is strictly preferred to y. 
 
As a general rule of rationality, we assume that the agent accepts ∀x∀y(xPy → ¬yPx). 
 
Let  a,  b,  c,  d denote programs A, B, C, D in the Kahneman and Tversky problem, 




the same program, and hence, on reflection, the agent would accept the propositions a = c and 
b = d. 
 
By the definition of the four programs, the agent has initial dispositions to accept the 
following (factual) propositions: 
(1) Program A saves some lives (200) with certainty; 
 i.e.  Qa. 
(2) Program B involves the risk that no-one will be saved (with probability 2/3 no-one 
will be saved); 
 i.e.  ¬Qb. 
(3) Program C consigns some people to death (400) with certainty; 
i.e.  Rc. 
(4) Program D offers the chance that no-one will die (with probability 1/3 no-one will 
die); 
i.e.   ¬Rd. 
 
We also suppose that the agent has initial dispositions to accept the following two general 
(normative) principles: 
(5) It is not worth taking the risk that no-one will be saved. Formally, if program y 
involves the risk that no-one will be saved, whereas program x saves some lives with 
certainty, then x is preferrable to y; 
i.e.  ∀x∀y((Qx ∧ ¬Qy) → xPy). 
(6) It is unacceptable to consign some people to death with certainty. Formally, if 
program x consigns some people to death with certainty, whereas program y offers the 
chance that no-one will die, then y is preferrable to x; 
i.e.   ∀x∀y((Rx ∧ ¬Ry) → yPx). 
 
Note that the agent’s initial dispositions are incomplete. While the agent has initial 
dispositions over factual propositions concerning the alternatives, such as (1) to (4), and over 
general normative principles such as (5) and (6), the agent may not have initial dispositions 
over specific ranking propositions such as aPb or cPd, as the agent may be unable to consider 
these in isolation, i.e. without having considered relevant factual and normative background 
propositions such as (1) to (6).  
 
It can easily be proved that the agent’s initial dispositions are implicitly, but not explicitly, 
inconsistent. Let Ψ1 = {Qa,  ¬Qb,  ∀x∀y((Qx  ∧  ¬Qy)  →  xPy)} and Ψ2 =   




(which implies ¬aPb). Further, the agent’s initial dispositions violate deductive closure: for 
instance, aPb is implied by a set of propositions which the agent has an initial disposition to 
accept (e.g. by the set Ψ1), and yet the agent has no initial disposition to accept aPb itself. As 
the agent’s initial dispositions are implicitly inconsistent with respect to the ranking 
proposition aPb, theorem 1 immediately implies that there exist two alternative decision-paths 
such that, under one path, aPb is accepted and, under the other, ¬aPb is accepted. We will 
now see that this result can be used to explain the Kahneman and Tversky framing problem.  
 
In that problem, the agent is being asked to make a decision between the alternative programs. 
So the target proposition to be considered by the agent is the ranking proposition aPb in the 
first presentation of the decision problem, and the ranking proposition cPd in the second 
presentation. Suppose now that the agent engages in a modus ponens decision process over 
the propositions. We suggest that the two different presentations of the problem, in terms of 
“lives saved” and “lives lost”, induce two different decision paths or run-ups to the target 
proposition, respectively: 
 
Path 1: ∀x∀y((Qx ∧ ¬Qy) → xPy) at time 1, Qa at time 2, ¬Qb at time 3, aPb at time 4 
Path 2: ∀x∀y((Rx ∧ ¬Ry) → yPx) at time 1, Rc at time 2, ¬Rd at time 3, dPc at time 4. 
 
At time 4, under each path, the agent accepts a ranking proposition, aPb under path 1, and 
dPc under path 2, which enables the agent to make a choice over the alternative programs, A 
under path 1, and D under path 2. Both decision-paths are incomplete in that they reach some 
but not all the relevant propositions which the agent has dispositions over and stop once the 
target proposition is reached. The inconsistency between the two alternative outcomes would 
become explicit if each of the two decision-paths were extended and the agent were to 
consider the propositions a = c and b = d next. Given the acceptance of a = c and b = d, the 
two paths lead to mutually inconsistent outcomes, aPb in path 1 and bPa (which implies 
¬aPb) in path 2.
6 
 
                                                           
6 In the original Kahneman and Tversky experiments, the two different presentations of the decision 
problem were given to two different groups of subjects, where the majority of one group preferred A to 
B, and the majority of the other D to C. Hence there was no opportunity for the same subject to reveal 
inconsistent preferences under the two alternative presentations. However, Kahneman and Tversky’s 
claim is that “[i]ndividuals who face a decision problem and have a definite preference (i) might have a 
different preference in a different framing of the same problem, (ii) are normally unaware of 
alternative frames and of their potential effects on the relative attractiveness of options, (iii) would 
wish their preferences to be independent of frame, but (iv) are often uncertain how to resolve detected 




Note that this result is not dependent on the fact that the agent’s initial dispositions are 
incomplete. This can be illustrated by making the agent’s initial dispositions complete, for 
instance by assuming that (in addition to the initial dispositions specified above) the agent has 
initial dispositions to accept aPb and cPd. This can be motivated by the assumption that the 
agent has already considered the decision problem under the first frame. The modified initial 
dispositions still satisfy weak consistency but are implicitly inconsistent because they violate 
deductive closure with respect to the ranking proposition dPc. Now theorem 2 immediately 
implies that there exist two alternative decision-paths such that, under one path, dPc is 
accepted and, under the other, ¬dPc is accepted. We can then give an explanation of the 
Kahneman and Tversky framing problem similar to the one given in this section. 
 
5. Violations of Procedure Invariance as Path-Dependence 
 
Violations of procedure invariance can also be understood as path-dependence. Take the 
preference reversal problem of Lichtenstein and Slovic introduced above. Let us define four 
predicates: 
 
Exy : x has a higher expected payoff than y. 
Sxy : x has a higher probability of winning the maximal payoff than y. 
Txy : x has a larger maximal payoff than y. 
xPy : x is strictly preferred to y. 
  
As before, as a rule of rationality, we assume that the agent accepts ∀x∀y(xPy → ¬yPx). 
 
Let p and d denote the P gamble and the $ gamble, respectively. 
 
By the definition of the two gambles, the agent has initial dispositions to accept the following 
(factual) propositions: 
(1) The $ gamble has a larger maximal payoff than the P gamble; 
i.e.  Tdp. 
(2) The P gamble has a higher probability of winning the maximal payoff than the $ 
gamble; 
i.e.  Spd. 
(3) Neither gamble has a higher expected payoff than the other; 





We also suppose that the agent has initial dispositions to accept the following two general 
(normative) principles: 
(4) For two gambles with the same expected payoff, the one with the higher probability 
of winning the maximal payoff is preferrable; 
i.e.   ∀x∀y((¬Exy ∧ ¬Eyx) → (Sxy → xPy)). 
(5) For two gambles with the same expected payoff, the one with the larger maximal 
payoff is preferrable; 
 i.e.   ∀x∀y((¬Exy ∧ ¬Eyx) → (Txy → xPy)). 
 
As in the Kahneman and Tversky problem of the previous section, the agent’s initial 
dispositions are incomplete, as the agent does not have initial dispositions over the ranking 
propositions dPp or pPd, and they are implicitly, but not explicitly, inconsistent. If we let Ψ1 
= {Tdp, (¬Epd  ∧  ¬Edp),  ∀x∀y((¬Exy  ∧  ¬Eyx)  → ( Txy  →  xPy))} and Ψ2 =   
{Spd, (¬Epd ∧ ¬Edp), ∀x∀y((¬Exy ∧ ¬Eyx) → (Sxy → xPy))}, then Ψ1 implies dPp, and Ψ2 
implies pPd (which implies ¬dPp). The agent’s initial dispositions also violate deductive 
closure with respect to dPp  and  pPd. Again, as the initial dispositions are implicitly 
inconsistent with respect to these ranking propositions, theorem 1 implies that there exist two 
alternative decision-paths such that, under one path, dPp is accepted and, under the other, 
¬dPp is accepted. In analogy to the explanation of the Kahneman and Tversky problem, this 
leads to an explanation of the Lichtenstein and Slovic problem. 
 
Again, we can take the target proposition to be the ranking proposition dPp. Under one 
presentation of the decision problem, the ranking between the two gambles determines which 
gamble to play, and under the other, which gamble to sell for a higher price. Suppose the 
agent engages in a modus ponens decision process over the propositions. Again, we suggest 
that the two different presentations of the decision problem, in terms of “which gamble is 
preferable to play” and “which price to sell each gamble for”, induce two different decision 
paths or run-ups to the target proposition, respectively: 
 
Path 1: ∀x∀y((¬Exy ∧ ¬Eyx) → (Sxy → xPy)) at time 1, (¬Exy ∧ ¬Eyx) at time 2, Spd at 
time 3, pPd at time 4. 
Path 2: ∀x∀y((¬Exy ∧ ¬Eyx) → (Txy → xPy)) at time 1, (¬Exy ∧ ¬Eyx) at time 2, Tdp at 
time 3, dPp at time 4. 
 
At time 4, under each path, the agent accepts a ranking proposition, pPd under path 1, and 




inconsistent with each other. If asked to choose which of the two gambles to play, i.e. under 
path 1, the agent would choose the P gamble over the $ gamble. If asked to specify a price for 
which to sell each gamble, i.e. under path 2, on the other hand, the agent would sell the $ 
gamble at a higher price than the P gamble. As in the example of the previous section, both 
decision-paths are incomplete in that they reach some but not all the relevant propositions 
which the agent has dispositions over and stop once the target proposition is reached.  
 
As before, the result is not dependent on the fact that the agent’s initial dispositions are 
incomplete. If we make the agent’s initial dispositions complete, for instance by assuming 
that the agent has the additional initial disposition to accept pPd (for instance, as a result of a 
previous choice), the modified initial dispositions still violate deductive closure with respect 





An agent’s choices are sometimes not invariant under changes in the way in which the choice 
problem is framed, be it the way in which the options are described or the way in which 
preferences are elicited. We have suggested that such framing effects may occur when the 
agent’s initial dispositions on the relevant propositions are implicitly inconsistent. The 
framing of the decision problem may make particular propositions salient, and thereby induce 
the order in which the propositions are considered. But if the agent’s initial dispositions are 
implicitly inconsistent, then, by theorem 1, the outcome of a modus ponens decision process 
is dependent on that order and hence dependent on the framing. Our model highlights 
similarities between violations of description invariance and procedure invariance, as it 
models both as being the result of different frames inducing different decision-paths which 
then lead to different outcomes in a modus ponens decision process (given implicit 
inconsistencies in the agent’s initial dispositions). 
 
Kenneth Arrow said that making the same choices in extensionally equivalent decision 
problems is, “[a]n elemental effect of rationality, so elemental that we hardly notice it” 
(Arrow 1982, p.6). Contrary to Arrow, we may hardly notice that our choices are not always 
the same in such decision problems. Although violations of description or procedure 
invariance are, on the present account, caused by inconsistencies in our initial dispositions, 
they can be caused by implicit inconsistencies, while explicit ones are not necessary. But 
implicit inconsistencies are precisely the kinds of inconsistencies an agent is (typically) not 




Explicit inconsistencies are of course special cases of implicit inconsistencies, i.e. sometimes 
an implicit inconsistency may also be an explicit one, in that the agent’s initial dispositions 
violate not only strong consistency, but also weak consistency. The fact that some subjects do 
not change their choices even when the inconsistency is pointed out to them suggests that 
some people are willing to hold explicitly inconsistent beliefs (Ordonez et al. 1995). When an 
inconsistency is implicit but not explicit (i.e. when the initial dispositions satisfy weak but not 
strong consistency), the implicit inconsistency is a result of a violation of deductive closure. 
By lemma 1, if the initial dispositions satisfy completeness, then a violation of deductive 
closure is a necessary and sufficient condition for an implicit inconsistency.  
 
Modelling framing as path-dependence is compatible with explanations of framing effects 
offered by philosophers and psychologists. The notion of normative propositions over which 
an agent has dispositions parallels the notion of reasons for choice discussed in philosophy 
and psychology. If agents were asked for their reasons for making a certain choice, they might 
select those normative propositions they would assent to in the run-up to making the choice. 
If different presentations of the problem make different normative propositions (or reasons) 
salient in the run-up to the choice, then all that is necessary for the existence of framing 
effects is that individuals have a disposition to assent to a set of propositions (or reasons) that 
have normative force for them, but that are not strongly consistent with each other (although 
they may be weakly consistent). What matters for the decision, in our model, is the particular 
propositions (reasons) that occur in the decision-path, but not other propositions outside the 
decision-path even if these seem also relevant from the perspective of an external observer. It 
is certainly conceivable that the totality of reasons that have normative force for an agent may 
not be strongly consistent. Our model finds support from the suggestion by psychologists that 
choice is "reason-based", with decision makers seeking and constructing reasons in order to 
justify their choices (Shafir, Simonson and Tversky 1993). People seem to wish to justify 
their decisions by saying that they chose for a (single) reason, even to the extent of 
constructing and selecting the situations they find themselves in so that there is always a 
dominant reason for choice (Montgomery 1983).  
 
We have used a logician’s framework to identify a necessary and sufficient condition for 
framing effects. The condition is precisely the non-satisfaction of a certain classical condition 
of rationality, namely the condition of strong consistency. To the extent that violations of that 
condition, i.e. implicit inconsistencies (or violations of other rationality conditions implying 
implicit inconsistencies), are prevalent, people will make different choices in extensionally 







Lemma A1. Suppose X contains neither tautologies nor contradictions. Then 
(i)  the set {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1} is semantically inconsistent 
if and only if 
(ii)  there exist two strongly consistent subsets Ψ1 and Ψ2 of X and a proposition φ 
in X such that [δ(ψ)=1 for every ψ in Ψ1 ∪ Ψ2] and [Ψ1 implies φ] and 
[Ψ2 implies ¬φ]. 
 
Proof of lemma A1. 
(i) implies (ii): 
Suppose (i) holds. Let Y be a maximal semantically consistent subset of {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1}. 
First, Y is non-empty, since X contains no contradictions. Second, Y is a proper subset of 
{φ∈X : δ(φ)=1}, since {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1} itself is not semantically consistent. Choose any 
ψ∈{φ∈X : δ(φ)=1}\Y. Since Y is a maximal semantically consistent subset of {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1}, 
Y∪{ψ} is not semantically consistent (otherwise Y would not be maximal),  and hence Y 
implies ¬ψ. Now let Ψ1 = {ψ} and Ψ2 = Y. Then Ψ1 and Ψ2 have the properties required by 
(ii). 
(ii) implies (i): 
Suppose (ii) holds. Since [Ψ1 implies φ] and [Ψ2 implies ¬φ], the set Ψ1∪Ψ2 is semantically 
inconsistent. But {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1} is a superset of Ψ1∪Ψ2. Therefore {φ∈X : δ(φ)=1} is also 
semantically inconsistent. ■ 
 
Lemma A2. For any φ in X, (i) φ is accepted in a modus ponens decision process for some 
decision-path Ω if and only if (ii) there exists a (semantically consistent) subset Ψ of X such 
that [δ(ψ)=1 for every ψ in Ψ] and [Ψ implies φ]. 
 
Proof of lemma A2.  
(i) implies (ii): 
Suppose (i) holds. Determine m such that Ω(m) = φ. Let Ψ = {ψ∈X : (ψ is accepted in the 
modus ponens decision process at time t≤m) and δ(ψ)=1}. Then Ψ has the properties required 
by (ii). 
(ii) implies (i):  
Suppose (ii) holds. Define Ω as follows. Let m = |Ψ∪{φ}|. On {1, 2, …, m}, let Ω be any 




we add the following definition. On {m+1, ..., k} (where k = |X|), let Ω be any bijective 
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